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Martin: Security and the Administration of Manuscript Holdings at Souther

SECURITY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF MANUSCRIPT HOLDINGS
AT SOUTHERN ACADEMIC LIBRARIES

Katherine F. Martin

Part I:
Administration, Staffing, and Physical Security
Any study, however cursory, of the professional care and management of manuscripts and related materials brings to light an important
difference between the handling of such items and of other resources
more commonly found in the academic library. Only in the domain of
the rare book librarian is the manuscript curator's emphasis on preservation, rather than the more characteristic accent on service, mirrored.

Preservation and protection have traditionally been the maxims
of those responsible for manuscript and archival materials. This
orientation has developed naturally out of the recognition of the
Wliqueness of such resources and their consequent historical and mone-

tary value.

With the development in this century of a new apprecia-

tion for original source materials, the manuscript curator bas more

and more come to realize the need to balance the objectives of preservation and service. Hence a middle ground between answering the demands of today's patron and insuring the preservation of irreplaceable records of the past for the enlightenment of future generations
has become the goal of the responsible administrator.
The last quarter century has seen the evolution of a growing uniformity in principle and practice where the security of manuscript
collections has been concerned. The goal has been the reduction of
physical damage and impaired usefulness caused by both human tampering
and such natural enemies as fire and water. If the emphases in the
professional literature can be accepted as accurate gauges of archivists' concerns, an increased awareness of security problems in gen-

eral and a growing first-hand contact with theft and mutilation in
particularl have focused attention on the problem of insuring preservation while continuing to provide service to qualified applicants.
Any reluctance to codify and uniformly enforce security regulations
has largely disappeared; and a.formal onslaught on security problems,
highlighted by the Society of American Archivists' creation of an
Archival Security Program in lg7s, has been initiated .
In the development of a professional consensus on what is desirable if not always attainable in security procedures, attention has
frequently been focused on combatting thievery. Changes in staff
training, surveillance techniques, exit control, physical arrangement
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of collections, inventorying, marking of manuscripts, and the screening, registration, and regulation of the reading room conduct of
patrons have been implemented in developing defenses against theft.
The role of fire and int~uder detection devices and of records on the
use and duplication of materials in improving security and collection
control has also been widely recognized . Complete and accurate records have proven crucial as well to the recovery of missing items and
the collection of insurance premiums. In order to combat both "knowing and innocent destruction and abuse"2 in all sectors, blind confidence and public faith have been abandoned and a variety of precautionary measures instituted.
What then have emerged as the primary keys to achieving the c ritical balance between collection security and maintaining accessibility? Two closely connected areas have been most frequently discussed
in the literature: the selection and training of personnel and the
regulation of readers.
Security begins with the screening and s c rutiny o f those employed
by the repository and of all others having acces s to the premises, including the maintenance, housekeeping, and other professional staff of
the institution. Starf attitude, particularly as it arfects security
procedures involving interaction with patrons, has also been recognized as crucial . As James B. Rhoads , then Assistant Archivist for
Civil Archives at the National Archives, noted in 1966, the training
and indoctrination of staff members must revolve around the precept
that "a good archivist must also be suspic i ous." He encouraged the
development of "collective vigilance" as a professional trait, believing it to be particularly valuable in discouraging the professional
thief.3
It is, however, as it affects relations with potential readers
that manuscript security has received the greatest attention. A
series of procedures which, as a whole, provide for complete control
of public use is commonly advocated. It is widely recommended that
. credentials of a potential researcher be carefully reviewed, his research purposes determined, and he be provided a written explanation
of the rules governing access. All personal possessions not essential
to the use of manuscripts are to be left outside the reading room; in
many instances it is suggested that only pencil and paper be allowed.
To monitor the actual use of collections, direct starf supervision,
daily registration, use of signed request forms, and limits on the
amount of manuscript material provided at one time are recommended.
Other favored security measures include such access controls as
restricted entry to stack areas and staff supervision of duplicating
procedures .

Even where such strict precautions are exercised, many

observers also recommend inventorying materials following their use
and examining patron possessions on departure.4
In support of such use regulations , a number of physical procedures have been developed; these also provide protection against
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after-hours theft and environmental hazards.

These measures include

the control of access to collection facilities, installation of devices to warn of fires and intruders, arranging for special storage

for particularly valuable items, providing protective devices for
displays, and preparing thorough descriptions of a collection's holdings.

Foremost among these precautionary measures, however, are

those which reduce the dangers connected with the handling of manuscripts. Recommended procedures include, for example, the substitution of copies for valuable items in order to avoid wear, reduce the

possibility of theft, and provide proof of ownership in the event the
original is stolen and subsequently recovered.5
A related, although far more controversial, practice is the mark-

ing of certain manuscripts with an indelible insigne of ownership.
While some believe that such alteration or defacement is to be discouraged, many authorities agree that the practice can be of value
when selectively applied to those items which are both valuable and
marketable, and thus most likely to tempt the professional thief.6
The recommendations that have been made by earnest and wellqualified analysts of the security problem constitute~ .!2!£ a comprehensive program for manuscript preservation that does not interfere
with use by qualified applicants. It remains to be determined, however, to what extent such proposals have been and can be translated
into practice. What is not to be found in the literature is an indication of the degree to which such procedures have been implemented.7
This study, conducted early in 1979, was designed to examine the
correlation between the theory propounded in the literature and the
safeguards actually employed by those institutions responsible for the
housing and protection of manuscripts. A questionnaire covering the
areas of administration, staffing, physical security, reader services,

insurance, and collection control was developed for this purpose.
Academic library repositories were surveyed in order to provide information on a broad variety of manuscript materials, collection sizes,
administrative structures, and financial conditions.
It was also

hoped that by this limitation of recipients to a single, although admittedly heterogeneous, type of repository that the problem of erroneous generalization could be avoided.
Questionnaires were distributed to institutional libraries in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vir-

ginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia so that a cross
section of academic library situations broad enough to permit national
as well as regional conclusions might be obtained.

At the same time,

this geographic limitation insured that the number of responses would
remain manageable. This was not a random sampling of the academic
libraries in the region, but an attempt at a comprehensive polling of
the institutions where manuscripts were to be found, whether in separate collections , institutional archives, or multimedia special collections, or as isolated items. Provision was made for anonymity on the
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part of the respondent.
Libraries were included in the survey on the basis of descriptions of special collections contained in the 1976-1977 and 1978
issues of the American Library Directory and the lists of repositories
included in Philip M. Hamer•s f!! Guide .12. Archives~ Manuscripts i!!.
~United~. the National~ Catalog of Manuscript~
tions, J. Albert Robbins • s American Literary Manuscripts, and f!! ~
list £!. Holdings i!!. Academic, Historical ~ ~ Libraries, ~
ums, and Authors' Homes in the United States {2d ed.).B Where these
soorce;-proved inc~si,;"e-;-I'ndividuaTCOilege catalogs were also
consulted.
Those libraries whose holdings appeared to consist wholly of oral
history transcripts or tapes or of college archives were excluded from
this survey. Where multiple libraries on a single campus had manuscript holdings, all were slated for separate surveying. When the
pre sence or absence of manuscript materials could not be confirmed,
institutions were included in order to avoid omission of a ny repositories.
The result was a list of 210 academic libraries. During the
month-long survey period, some type of response was received from 129
of these (61 . 4%); however, only 86 {40.9%) were usable in this project . Most of those eliminated reported having no manuscript materials .
It is hoped that analysis of the information obtained through the
survey will contribute to an understanding of the way in which security policies and procedures in individual repositories differ with
size of collection, administrative structure, and the nature of the
host institution. While the impact of financial constraints does not
go unrecognized, this evaluation should also illustrate institutional
priorities and preferences as they relate to the range of security
procedures that can be implemented.
Finally, it is hoped that this
study will aid in identifying areas in need of continued attention and
improvement .
The nature of the security measures prevailing in the institutions participating in this survey might tentatively be explained by
the relative youth of those manuscript collecting programs. Sixty-six
institutions reported the founding date of the manuscript collection
or the collecting practice of their libraries. Only eight (12.1%) of
these respondees laid claim to pre- twentieth century origins, with
three dating from the 1830's. Thirty-six (54.5%) reported that manuscripts had become part of their library holdings only in the lg6o•s
and 1970•s, with this number evenly divided between the two decades .
The youngest collections were established in 1977.
A similar clustering of responses characterized the reports of
the number of separate manuscript groups administered by each repository. Of the sixty-five respondents on this topic , twenty-one (32.3%)
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held fewer than twenty- five such groups, while another twen ty ( 30 . 7% )
had between twenty- five and one hundred. Only six collections
(9.23% ) a dminister ed more t han one thousand manuscript groups . 9
The majority of the manuscript collections in the responding
libraries were not only recently established and fairly small but were
also administered jointly with other special materials; this was true
in fifty - ni ne (68.6%) cases. Only twenty- two institutions {25.6%) r eported havi ng separat e manuscript departments in their libraries. In
fo ur insti t utions manu script holdings were under the jurisdiction of
the reference department .
Whatever the size of the collection, and whether it was administered separ ately or i n conjunction with other mater ials, it was dependent for its security first and foremost upon the staff responsible
for its care and management. In the majority of libraries surveyed,
manuscripts were administered by a very small number of staff members .
Of the seventy- nine institutions providing information about their
personnel, thirty- one {39 . 24%) reported that manuscript materials were
the concern of only one full - time professional staff member , who had
either one or no full - time nonprofessional assistant. Eighteen
libraries {22 . 78%) had only one full-time staff member with responsibility for their manuscript collections . The largest staff reported
numbered thirty-eight full-time employees, including five p r ofessiona ls; two other libraries had combined full- time staf fs of t hirteen
individuals in the department responsible for manuscript holdings.
Very few institutions noted the presence of numerous part-time staff
members; for the most part, these appeared to be students with limited
d u ties.
The first factor in security is prevention, and, whatever its

size or training, the alertness and general reliability of the staff
are critical elements in achieving this goal. Staff contributions to
an effective security program can include, in addition to such expected expedients as careful surveillance and the regulation of patron
behavior, the maintenance of a reliable catalog and other fi nding
aids, regular inventorying of at least the more important individual
items, and the preparation and long- term preservation of access logs,

all of vital aid in the identification and recovery of materials.
Surprisingly, in spite of strong recommendations to the contrary

in the literature,10 few of the responding libraries appear to have
any formal organization for security purposes; this is true of both
the individual departments and of the library systems. Only in eighteen {22.2%) of the eighty-one institutions that provided information
on this topic is there a library security officer. And in only two
repositories {2 . 46%), both of which number among the largest collections, is there an individual who can be considered a staff security
officer in the manuscript department; even here, the allocation of
this responsibility is informal and does not reflect any special
t r aining .
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Few libraries run security checks on those responsible for manuscript materials, although the participation of insiders in the theft
of these items has been amply demonstrated in recent years . Only in
six (7.69%) of the seven~y-eight institutions responding to this
query were such background investigations conducted, and then not always as a regular practice . In certain repositories only those whom
the staff already knew or who were recommended by tru.s ted mutual acquaintances were ordinarily hired. The general absence of such formal
precautions might well be attributed to the nature of institutional
hiring policies, and to limits on time and resources, as well as a
natural reluctance to go beyond the written record and personal impressions.
One of the simplest and most economical securi ty measures is the
use of staff identification badges . Yet only one library among the
eighty-six respondents makes such a demand of both its special collections and regular staff; another limits this practice to the student
assistants in its manuscript department. In five other cases the
wearing of such badges is optional, and it is under consideration in
a sixth. The small size of many staffs would, of c ourse, limit the
need for such identification for security purposes. Yet the practice
would be helpful in distinguishing between nondepartmental staff and
outsiders for the pw:poses of restricting access and challenging intruders.
Supplementing the activities of a carefully selected and welltrained staff and, in fact, making worthwhile their security consciousness is a secure physical plant . This is effected through the
implementation of a variety of procedures which support surveillance
efforts and enhance physical security without unduly impeding or inconveniencing the public. What archivist Theodore R. Schellenberg
wrote of archival construction is equally applicable to the quarters
housing a manuscript collection: "An archival building should be designed for the purpose of protecting and making accessible to the utmost degree the contents of the building.nll One of the simplest
ways to promote security is by limiting the number of public entrances
that need to be observed during operating hours and made fast against
intrusion at others. On this point the majority of those su.r veyed
score high, with sixty-two (72.09%) having only one entry to the area
housing the collection. Another thirteen (15.1%) reported two entrances, while four (4.65%) have three entries.
Exit control during operating hours mirrors this limitation on
access to the collection area. Seventy-two (83.72%) of the eighty-six
institutions surveyed employ some type of observation or inspection
designed to prevent unauthorized removal of manuscript materials. Of
these, twenty-eight (38 . 8%) require patrons to check out with a staff
member stationed in the exit area . Twelve more (16.6%) rely on a more
informal observation of those departing. The building exit control
facilities suffice for another five (6. 94%) . Twenty-two repositories
(25.5%) employ more rigorous measures, with eleven maintaining locked
quarters at all times, five possessing door alarms or buzzers to
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control unapproved exit, and six relying on habitual inspection of
either materials used by the patron or his personal possessions. Of
the remaining nineteen repositories, five utilize some unspecified

form of exit control while nine depend on public trustworthiness
alone.

An equal variety in method, including use of both local and externally connected alarm systems, lock and key control, and afterhours lighting, c haracterizes the prevention of unauthorized entry
after hours. By far the most popular of these provisions is lock and
key control, with eighty (95.2%) of the eighty-four respondents to
this question indicating their reliance on this procedure. Approximately one-fourth of the libraries employ security guards (22 . 6% ) or
after-hours lighting (25%), either singly or in combination with other
practices. Some thirty-nine 0£ the responding repositories (46.4%)
use a combination of preventatives. Twenty- three employ a pair of
protective measures, twelve rely on three approaches, and two utilize
either four or five means of restricting entry. The most common com-

binations are lock and key control and after-hours lighting (seven
institutions) or lock and key controls and security guards (six institutions).
Forty-three (50%) of the security systems were described as being
part of overall library security and thirty-three (38.3%) as peculiar
to the department housing manuscripts. In six instances intruder control shared certain characteristics with the entire building while
also introducing individual features. Not surprisingly, twice as many
of the multiple element systems were part of total library security
(twenty-three) as were peculiar to the administering departments
(eleven).
Successful after- hours security also demands severe limitations
on the number of individuals permitted access at such times . Ideally,
no one other than tested members of the departmental staff should be
allowed unsupervised after-hours access. Such is the case in twentyone (24.7%) of the eighty-five libraries addressing themselves to this
topic; sixteen more (18.8%) are even more security conscious, with no
one granted after-hours entry. For the most part, however, the
library staff is generally extended this privilege; fifty - two (61.17%)
of the repositories permit such access to departmental staff and
twenty-nine more (34.1%) to other staff members.
Security (twenty-four respondents or 28 . 2%) or maintenance and
housekeeping (thirty-four respondents or 40%) personnel are frequently
allowed after-hours access. In two institutions only the security and
housekeeping personnel are then admitted. Yet, only four departments
(4.7%) allow faculty such entry, with three (3.5%) extending the privilege to graduate students; one institution grants access to both
parties . Twelve institutions (14.1%) include another individual in
this privileged group; as a rule, this is the library director or university librarian. One repository permits the university historian
and his assistants such access .
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Another means of providing protection to the collection, particularly to its exceptionally valuable items, is the use of a vault or
such substitutes as locked closets, storage cabinets, or stack areas.
The widespread appreciation of such security devices is reflected in
their use by fifty-one (59.3%) of the responding institutions. While
only seventeen repositories have an actual vault, another thirty-one
employ some other type of special locked storage. These facilities
are frequently well-utilized . Of the forty libraries estimating the
number of manuscripts so stored, five reported that all items are so
housed . It should be noted, however, that some repositories frown on
this segregation of special items in a vault or similar storage area,
believing that the practice merely makes valuable materials more vulnerable to theft and total destruction by fire or flood.
To be truly effective as a security procedure, such safekeeping
should be accompanied by the use of a log registering the removal and
return of manuscripts, and by limiting access to the storage area.
Yet only seventeen (33.3%) of those so housing materials maintain any
such records. Similarly, of the twenty-seven libraries which limit
the staff who have access to such storage quarters, fourteen (51.8%)
permit entry to three or more individuals. Twenty-three report that
these areas are open to all staff members, although in some instances
it is not clear whether this means only departmental or all library
personnel.
Special protection against human foes also needs to be afforded
to manuscript materials on exhibit, common victims of thievery. While
the use of a local alarm system is recommended to protect these items,
with the warning that it should not be audible to the intruder who in
his panic might cause greater damage,12 such a device is rarely employed. The Burns Security Institute•s National Survey 2!! Library
Security, published in 1973, found that 70 percent of the public
libraries it polled provided no special protection for valuable displays.13 Manuscript repositories can claim no better record. While
seventy-seven (98.7%) of the seventy-eight libraries which maintain
manuscript exhibits do provide locked cases, only three (3.84%) also
employ an alarm system.
The protection provided for valuable or particularly vulnerable
manuscript items through vaults or locked exhibit cases can also be
extended to the bulk of the collection by curtailing stack access during operating hours. Surveillance of the reading room and the exercise of physical collection controls are useless as security procedures if outsiders are permitted unattended admission to storage
areas. Such a restriction is, in fact, one of the four basic requirements for collection security put forth by James B. Rhoads in his
landmark article, "Alienation and Thievery: Archival Problems.nl4 In
thirty- eight (53.52%) of the seventy-one libraries having formal storage areas, patrons are permitted a certain freedom of access. However, the exercise of this privilege ftequently requires that a staff
member be in attendance.
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These precautions are geared primarily to the prevention of
theft, but the thorough repository is also concerned with the protection of fragile items from both innocent and intentional abuse. One
procedure that fulfills both functions is limiting access to certain
materials. Fifty-six of those surveyed (65.1%) restrict the use of
certain collections, while forty (46.5%) libraries make some materials
available for use only under special conditions.
In forty-one cases,
however, these restraints arise primarily from conditions imposed by
the donor.
In four cases archival discretion and concern for confidentiality also govern access. Physical condition is cited as a reason for restricting access or requiring special handling in only nine
cases. The various conditions imposed include the substitution of
microfilm for items in poor condition, limiting the use of old film,
banning xeroxing of fragile items, and requiring cotton gloves when
handling photographs. Use of special materials may also result in increased surveillance.
The use of photocopies or other duplicates such as typescripts
and microfilm is, however, more widespread among the survey group.
This widely recommended procedure calls for making substitution for
rare, fragile, and even controversial items, and storing the originals
in a different location. This practice prevents deterioration through
use, reduces the opportunity for theft or mutilation, and, in the
event the original is pilfered, provides both a record of ownership
and an irrefutable means of identifying the item if recovered.15
Among the manuscript departments surveyed, such substitution is widely
exercised, with fifty-seven (66.2%) employing the practice to some
degree.
Use of finding aids can also prove of value in maintaining collection control. The descriptions of individual items contained
therein, likely to be of the monetarily valuable materials most subject to theft, are vital to the inventorying, identification, and recovery of these items. Conversely, exclusion of information about exceptionally rare or valuable items, particularly from published and
widely circulated collection guides, may deprive the professional
thief of vital knowledge.
The massive and almost always impossible
task of completely identifying holdings is reflected in the analysis
of their finding aids conducted by seventy-six of the libraries participating in this survey. Of these, forty-four (57.8%) assert that
missing materials can be identified through information contained in
such tools. Only fourteen (18 . 4%) of the libraries having such a resource report the deliberate exclusion of certain valuable materials
from the collection guides .
The protection of manuscripts while in use is, of course, one of
the primary concerns of those responsible for their administration and
preservation. One of the most controversial ways of insuring against
theft, particularly as it is motivated by resale possibilities, is the
marking of individual items with an indelible institutional indicium.
The stamping of manuscripts is one of the most widely recommended
security procedures and is preferred over embossing or perforation.
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There is a significant impediment to widespread implementation
of this procedure: "No automatic self- feeding stamping machine has
so far been found to do the job satisfactorily for materials which
are as variable in size, thickness, area of inscribed surface, and
sturdiness as the indiv1dual components of a collection of manuscripts . 016 For this reason, the need for selectivity in utilizing
this measure is recognized, with the greatest attention being given
individual items that are both valuable and marketable. The manual
labor and time commitment involved in isolating, stamping, and recording the marking of these materials also goes far in explaining the
limited adoption of this process by the libraries surveyed. Eighteen
(20.93%) of these institutions mark some manuscript items. Another
three repositories report that portions of their collections are
property-stamped, although this is not their current practice . Two
others intend to institute such a program. No correlation can be made
between use of this security procedure and either size or age of the
colleCtion.
The most comprehensive means of maintaining collection control
is to be found, however, not in the stamping of manuscripts or the
preparation of complete finding aids but in the production, preservation, and continual updating of such tools as shelflists and access
logs, and in regular inventorying, at least of designated special
items. The value of these practices is recognized to varying degrees
by institutions which participated in this study.

Sixty-three ( 73.25%) report the existence of a shelflist. Fiftythree (61.62%) conduct inventories; twenty-seven of the whole collection, sixteen of special items only, and five of both. Two did not
specify the nature of their inventory practice . Shelflists represent
a continual updating process at thirty-one (49.2%) of the sixty-three
repositories which produce them; another six have updated this record
during the past year. Five repositories were engaged in such updating
at the time this survey was conducted. Of the fifty - three departments
which inventory their holdings, twenty- five (47 . 16%) do so on a regular basis; thirty- one conducted some form of inventory during the past
year.
Only twenty- nine repositories (33 . 73%) report that they maintain
the access logs vital both in tracing thefts and establishing culpability; at least twenty of these appear to have near-complete records,
most commonly in the form of researcher request slips. Of these
twenty- nine repositories, nineteen (65 . 5%) report visits by 250 or
more researchers during the previous fiscal year; these nineteen constitute nearly 50 percent of those reporting this number of patrons.
Physical protection, not only against the human foe but also
against the hazards of the elements, can be extended to manuscripts
through the installation of fire detection and control devices and
through the elimination of storage are~s susceptible to water damage .
Where these precautions fail, the shelflist and inventory along with
complete finding aids can prove invaluable in identifying damaged or
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destroyed materials.
The National Fire Protection Association notes that the location
of the parent building, type of construction materials, arrangement
of the interior, quality of storage arrangements, and proximity of
the local fire department are all crucial elements in combatting this
threat; but the individual manuscript department or special collection has little influence over precautions in this area other than
soliciting the fire detection and suppression equipment necessary to
protect its holdings adequately.17 Fourteen means of combatting fire
have been identified by the National Fire Protection Association,18
but in actual practice the choices of those concerned with protecting
manuscript materials are much more limited.
Security expert Timothy Walch reports that the water sprinkler,
which is the most economical, and the gas device, including carbon
dioxide and the Halon system, are most commonly used in archival situations.19 There are problems with t he use of noncombustible gas as a
fire-fighting device because of its toxicity to humans; for many
libraries such a system is also prohibitively expensive. Only four
(4.87%) of the eighty-two respondents on this topic use the Halon 1301
system, while two others (2.43%) rely on carbon dioxide.
In four of
these six cases, the system was supplemented with other preventative
measures.
The type of f i re protection devices more commonly employed reflects little of the current emphasis on control without contributing
to damage with water or chemical agents. Sixty-six of eighty-two respondents (80.48%) relied on fire extinguishers. Half as many use
either smoke sensors (thirty-three libraries or 40.24%) or fire doors
(thirty-four libraries or 42.68%) to control potential fire damage.
Sixteen departments (19.51%) possess f ire hose units and twelve
(14.63%) have sprinkler systems, while only thirteen (15.85%) employ
temperature-sensitive detection devices.
Some fifty-three of the eighty-two repositories providing information about fire prevention and control efforts utilize two or more
means of combatting or detecting this hazard. Of these, twenty-two
(26.82%) employ two such measures, while twenty-one (25 . 6%) rely on
three or more. The most popular combinations of devices always include fire extinguishers, reflecting economy and general library practice. Six libraries utilize extinguishers in combination with fire
doors, five with smoke sensors, and four with hose units . Use of extinguishers, fire doors, and smoke sensors is combined by five institutions; while four depend on extinguishers, fire doors, and hose
units.
Sixty-four (75.29%) of the eighty-five respondents on this topic
also prohibit smoking under all conditions; this is a precaution
strongly recommended by both the National Fire Protection Association
and the Committee on the Use of Manuscripts established by the Association of Research Libraries. Of those who do permit smoking, many

11

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 1980

11

Georgia Archive, Vol. 8 [1980], No. 1, Art. 2

restrict this privilege to staff members while they are not handling
manuscript materials, or limit the practice to certain areas of the
collection, such as the director's office.
Perhaps more of a threat than fire is the other elemental enemy
of paper, water. Water is omnipresent in the form of institutional
piping and can be more difficult to control when flood situations occur. Water can also inflict substantial damage when employed in fire fighting. As Pamela W. Darling, head of the Preservation Department
at Columbia University Libraries, notes in her 1978 article, "Our
Fragile Inheritance: The Challenge of Preserving Library Materials,"
disaster in a library almost always means water .20 At least some of
the manuscripts and departmental records of thirty (34.8%) of the
libraries participating in this study remain where they are believed
vulnerable to damage from this agent.
Even the fullest preparation for disaster, whether natural or
wreaked by human hands, is not complete as long as it remains unsupplemented by adequate insurance coverage.
Insurance monies cannot,
of course, replace lost or destroyed manuscript materials . But they
can make possible the substitution of related or similar items. A
majority of those surveyed do not possess such protection.
When items are insured under an "agreed risk clause," 21 their
stated value for this purpose may be the purchase price or an appraised worth estimated by an expert in the field.
In the case of
manuscripts, when the items in question are not replaceable, such
valuation becomes purely arbitrary. Under a "valued" policy, the insurance company accepts the stated value as the amount of the loss if
the item is stolen or destroyed; the amount of recompense may depend
on whether the proposed value is viewed as reasonable or on the size
of the insurance premium the library is willing to pay.22
Few libraries appear to take advantage of this opportunity to
insure adequately their special collections . Only fourteen (16.27%)
of those surveyed hold such special insurance policies on valued
items; two others remain uncertain as to whether such coverage is
available to them. Of the fourteen, only eight have policies that
reflect current market values; the same number report having updated
their coverage during the past year, with three describing this as an
annual practice. Twelve of the fourteen possess insurance that provides for the loss of individual items.

An equally important element of insurance protection is even more
frequently neglected by the repositories participating in this study.
Departmental personnel may be insured under an employee dishonesty
bond that includes all staff without their having to be specifically
identified. Such bonding is available in two forms: with a limit per
employee involved in the defalcation, or with a limit per loss.23
Only seven (9.85%) of the seventy-one ~espondents on this topic report holding such insurance; another ten are ignorant of the state of
their coverage. The seven that do insure against employee theft have
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staffs ranging from one full-time employee to seven full-time and ten
or more part-time pe r sonnel .
The security record of manuscript repositories, judging from the
institutions surveyed, remains a mixed one. Yet the concern for improving security procedures is there. Largely small and understaffed,
frequently underfunded and confined to antiquated and unsuitable
quarters, many of these facilities have implemented the physic al safeguards and established the record-k~ping systems recommended for protecting the valuable materials under their care.

(Part II of Ms. Martin ' s study of security practices at southern
academic libraries, "Security Procedures and the Patron," will appear
in the fall issue of Georgia Archive.)
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